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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Granting Petersen's Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
After locating a large amount of cash in Petersen's trunk and subsequently

finding marijuana during a search of the passenger compartment of his vehicle,
the state charged Petersen with money laundering, attempted destruction of
evidence,

misdemeanor

paraphernalia.

possession

of

marijuana

and

possession

of

(R., pp.86-88, 201-203; Tr., p.28, L.12 - p.29, L 12.) Petersen

moved for suppression of evidence claiming the "search and seizure and arrest
by the officers was unlawful and without legal justification."

(R., pp.98-99.)

Petersen also filed a motion to dismiss the information charging him with money
laundering and attempted destruction of evidence based on his claim that there
was insufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to support a
finding of probable cause. (R., pp.131-149.) The trial court granted his motion to
suppress, finding there was no probable cause present to search the passenger
compartment of Peterson's car.

(R., p.219.)

It also dismissed the money

laundering charge, finding "no evidence, only mere speculation" of a violation of
the money laundering statute.

(R., p.225.)

The state appealed, arguing that

evidence that Petersen was trafficking in drugs provided probable cause to
believe there was evidence of criminal behavior in the passenger compartment of
Petersen's vehicle and that there was sufficient probable cause to believe
Peterson committed the crime of money laundering. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-13.)
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In response, Petersen initially argues the state has failed to provide an
adequate record for review because the record does not establish this Court's
jurisdiction or the preservation of the issues argued by the state on appeal.
(Respondent's brief, pp.11-14.) Additionally, Petersen argues the trial court was
correct in suppressing the evidence found in his car because law enforcement
lacked probable cause.

(Respondent's brief, pp.14-27.) In the alternative, he

contends the district court erroneously rejected his claim officers improperly
extended the duration of the traffic stop. (Id.) Petersen further argues the trial
court's dismissal of the money laundering charge against Petersen should be
affirmed because the only connection to the charged offense and any evidence
supporting the charge was based on "mere speculation" of a "nebulous drug
trafficking operation." (Respondent's brief, pp.27-34.) Review of the record and
application of the correct legal standards show these arguments are without
merit.

B.

The Record Supports This Court's Jurisdiction
Petersen asserts this Court has no jurisdiction to hear his case.

(Respondent's brief, p.12.) Petersen cites to Department of Health & Welfare v.
John Doe I, 147 Idaho 314, 208 P.3d 296 (2009), for the proposition that "when
the appellate record does not include the notice of appeal, the appellate court
does not have jurisdiction to hear the case." (Respondent's brief, p.12.) In Doe

!, the Court was "precluded from reviewing [the] case on the merits because a
notice of appeal to th[e] Court was never filed." 147 Idaho at 316, 208 P.3d at
298.

Here, the state timely filed a timely notice of appeal with the Court.
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Although not originally included in the record on appeal, a motion to augment has
been filed contemporaneously with the filing of this reply brief.

Appellate

jurisdiction was established by filing a notice of appeal timely from the district
court's order granting suppression and dismissal.

C.

Petersen's Claim That The State Failed To Preserve Issues Below For
Appeal Is Without Merit
Petersen also asserts the state has failed to provide an adequate record

on appeal establishing it properly preserved the issues asserted on appeal.
(Respondent's brief, pp.12-14.) This argument fails because Petersen raised the
issues with his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss and the district court
directly decided it.

Petersen's argument is essentially that the state failed to

place on the record an exception to the court's ruling, which has not been
necessary to preserve an appellate issue in Idaho for decades.
It is basic appellate law that issues actually decided by the trial court are
reviewable on appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645
(1998).

In addition, although issues must generally be raised before the trial

court to be preserved for appellate review, there is no requirement that the party
taking the appeal be the party to raise the issue. See State v. Harris, 132 Idaho
843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (allowing one party to seek review of issue
raised by opposing party in intermediate appeal). Thus, Petersen's claim that the
questions of whether the search of his vehicle was justified by an exception to
the warrant requirement and if the charge of money laundering had been

3

supported by probable cause as to each element were not preserved is valid only
if the court did not decide those question and he did not himself raise it.
The state presented argument before district court after Petersen raised
the issues of whether the search of Petersen's vehicle was valid and if there was
sufficient information to support the charges against him and the court decided
the issues raised by Petersen. (R., pp. 200-230.)
Petersen's argument that the state must be the party that preserved the
very issues he raised in his motion and that were decided by the court is
essentially an argument that the state failed to put on the record an exception to
the court's ruling. See Lyon v. Melgard, 66 Idaho 599, 602, 163 P.2d 1019, 1020
(1945) (court "precluded" from considering or passing on rulings made by lower
court where "no exception was taken to these rulings"). Such is not currently the
law in Idaho. See I.R.C.P. 7(c), 46; State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d
871, 873 (1992) (appellate court may consider issues raised to trail court); State
v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378,387,630 P.2d 665,674 (1981) (same); State v. DuValt,
131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641, 645 (1998) (matters actually decided by lower
court may be reviewed on appeal).

To the extent Petersen is requesting this

Court to hold that an issue raised by one party and decided by the court is not
preserved unless the other party specifically notes an exception to the ruling, the
state requests this Court to reject such a request.
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D.

The District Court Erred When It Granted Petersen's Motion To Suppress
As discussed in the Appellant's brief, the "automobile exception" to the

warrant requirement allows the police to search a vehicle without a warrant when
there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of
a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v.
Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981).

The analysis of

whether an officer had probable cause for an automobile search is whether,
based on the objective facts, a magistrate would have issued a warrant under
similar circumstances. State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 864, 934 P.2d 34, 37
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121, 123, 795 P.2d 15, 17 (Ct.
App. 1990).

Determining the existence of probable cause is "a practical,

common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances ... , there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found .... " Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

Probable cause does not require an actual

showing of criminal activity, but only the "probability or substantial chance" of
such activity.

kt

at 244-45 n.13. A practical, nontechnical probability that

incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981). The
facts known to the officers must be judged in accordance with "the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
"If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal
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activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d
572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence
might be found." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009).
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, there was probable cause to
believe incriminating evidence of money laundering and/or drug trafficking would
be found in Petersen's car based on the discovery of the large amount of money
in Petersen's trunk when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances
present to the officers before and during the traffic stop of Petersen. (R., p.219.)
The totality of the circumstances need not point to the existence of evidence of a
specific crime, State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 601, 237 P.3.d 1222, 1227 (Ct.
App. 2010), and officers here had sufficient reason to believe evidence of a crime
would be found in the passenger compartment of Peterson's car.
indicators of criminal activity included:

The possible

Petersen's hands were shaking "quite

noticeably" (Tr., p.19, Ls.17-18), there was a half-empty 12-pack container of
Diet Pepsi on the passenger seat next to Petersen (Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.21, L.10),
the officer saw two cell phones on the passenger seat (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-13), and
there an air freshener in the center console of the clean car (Tr., p.21, Ls.16-18).
Testimony of the officer was that taken alone, none of the above observations
were necessarily of concern, however,
when you are seeing that, the way the vehicle was set up, the
nervousness, and the body indicators, and take all the totally [sic] of
the circumstances, and put them into one, you start to develop
reasonable suspicion that something else is going on other than
this person is being pulled over for a traffic stop.
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(Tr., p.22., Ls.15-20.)

Additionally, the car Petersen was driving was newly

registered and Petersen was on his way to his second trip to Seattle from
Minnesota by way of Montana to meet a "lady friend of his." (Tr., p.23, Ls.11-23.)
Pursuant to a valid consent search, officers discovered a large sum of money in
a grocery bag inside of a duffle bag located in the trunk, bundled in a manner
consistent with the bundling of drug proceeds.

(Tr., p.27, Ls.7-16.) Although

unemployed for the previous four years, Petersen claimed to always travel with
that much cash and then remembered he was going to purchase a motor home
in Seattle. (Tr., p.27, L.21 - p.28, L.10.) He also claimed to have so much cash
on hand because he previously owned a used car dealership that dealt in cash,
despite his previous acknowledgment of being unemployed for the past four
years. (Tr., p.30, Ls.19-23.)
Because there was probable cause to believe there was evidence of
criminal behavior in the passenger compartment of Petersen's vehicle, the district
court erred in granting his motion to suppress.

E.

Petersen Has Not Established His Alternative Claim That The District
Court Erred In Rejecting His Claim That Officers Improperly Extended The
Duration Of The Traffic Stop
Petersen asserts in his reply brief that if the Court agrees with the state's

position that there was probable cause, the suppression order should be affirmed
on the alternative basis that the "officers unreasonably prolonged their detention
of Mr. Petersen."

(Respondent's brief, p.20.)

The district court considered

Petersen's arguments on this point below and correctly concluded "a reasonable
person would have believed he or she was at liberty to ignore the police
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presence and go about his or her business once the officers terminated their
questioning, returned Defendant's documentation, and asked if he was good to
go." (R., p.215 (footnote excluded).) Petersen has failed to show otherwise.
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate
court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts." State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power
to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence,
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,
555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).

The appellate court also gives

deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial
evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S.
Const. Amend. IV. While routine traffic stops by police officers implicate the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), because a traffic stop is more similar to an investigative detention than a
custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "An
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts
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which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983, 88 P.3d at 1223 (citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). An
investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion must not only be justified
at its beginning, but must be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
"The purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, however, at the moment the
stop is initiated, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion
of criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop." Sheldon, 139
Idaho at 984, 88 P.3d at 1224.

Routine traffic stops may turn up suspicious

circumstances which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the
stop. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990).
"The officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop
may-and often do-give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry
and further investigation by an officer."

kl

"A detention may evolve into a consensual encounter where the officer
returns the driver's license and other documents and engages in any subsequent
questioning without further show of authority, which would convey a message
that the individual is not free to leave." State v. Huffstutler, 145 Idaho 261, _ ,
178 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2006). In this case, the district court concluded the
stop was not in fact extended but turned into a consensual encounter once the
officer "returned [Petersen's] license and accompanying information, and also
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asked [Petersen] if he was 'good to go."'

(R., p.215.)

The trial court found

Petersen did think he was free to go, "clearly evidenced by the fact that he
acknowledged that he was good to go, shook the officer's [sic] hands, and began
to leave before the officers reinitiated questioning." (Id.)
Petersen has failed to show that the district court erred by declining to
conclude the officers unlawfully extended the traffic stop when it held "a
reasonable person would have believed he or she was at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his or her business" had they been in Petersen's
position.
F.

The District Court Erred When It Granted Petersen's Motion To Dismiss
Petersen next contends the evidence presented by the state to support a

charge of money laundering was insufficient and based on speculation of a
"nebulous drug trafficking operation." (Respondent's brief, p.35.) As discussed
in the state's opening brief on appeal, the preliminary hearing testimony shows
otherwise.
The police found a duffel bag in Petersen's trunk containing a grocery
sack with thousand dollar stacks of money wrapped in rubber bands in a manner
consistent with how drug dealers wrap their money. (PH Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12,
L.16.) The undocumented money was "suspicious" (PH Tr., p.12, Ls.17-24), and
although Peterson indicated there was $55,000 in the grocery bag (PH Tr., p.12,
L.10), there was actually over $72,000 (PH Tr., p.51, Ls.22-23). Petersen stated
he had not had a job for the previous four years, yet also stated he "travels with
that much cash all the time."

(PH Tr., p.13, Ls.7-19.)
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Petersen belatedly

explained he "was going to Seattle to buy a motor home." (PH Tr., p.13, Ls.4-6.)
Seattle, however, is known as a "major distributor of marijuana" (PH Tr., p.27,
Ls.18-19) and it is common for someone from the east to buy drugs cheap on the
west coast and take them back to make a "big profit" (PH Tr., p.28, L.5 - p.29,
L.5). Additionally, in Petersen's vehicle were a small amount of marijuana (PH
Tr., p.41, Ls.8-19), a receipt for the purchase of over $400 worth of fertilizers and
growing methods from a store in Minneapolis, Minnesota (PH Tr., p.61, L.8 p.62, L.6), and a diagram on how to grow marijuana (PH Tr., p.60, Ls.14-15).
The car showed a recent temporary registration out of Montana although
Petersen was from Minnesota and his vehicle odometer showed a high mileage
since the registration. (Tr., p.56, Ls.8 - p.57, L.1, p.62, L.24 - p. 63, L.2.)
Although Petersen argues there was no evidence presented to establish
Petersen was even aware of a connection between the money found in his trunk
and "the alleged criminal enterprise" (Respondent's brief, p.34), intent may be
inferred from the defendant's conduct or from circumstantial evidence.

See

State v. Pole, 79 P.3d 729 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47, 13
P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000). Additionally, I.C. § 18-115 provides that "intent
or intention is manifested by the commission of the acts and surrounding
circumstances connected with the offense." The state was not required to prove
the elements of money laundering beyond reasonable doubt at the preliminary
hearing. Contrary to the district court's holding, it is reasonable to conclude,
based on the evidence presented at preliminary, hearing that not only was
Petersen concealing and/or transporting this large amount of undocumented
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cash, but his purpose was to use the money to develop or continue operation of
a drug trafficking enterprise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence and dismissing count I of the information.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of May, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE AP PELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

NLS/pm

12

